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ABSTRACT
The Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction over 28 politically,
culturally and linguistically disparate member states in the interpretation and
application of EU law. Throughout its 60-year history, the Court has banned
publication of the separate opinions of its judges and their voting records favouring
instead brief unsigned unanimous decisions achieved by majority vote. The CJEU
defends its practice in the interests of protecting judicial independence and its own
authority and legitimacy. The Court’s critics call for greater transparency by
publishing dissenting opinions along the lines of the United States Supreme Court.
The CJEU is one of the world’s most influential courts as well as a trusted EU
institution with everything to lose if it lost authority and legitimacy. Introducing
dissenting opinions exposing the CJEU to the challenges of non-compliance with
its rulings and its judges to endemic corruption would put its independence,
authority and legitimacy at serious risk. Non-compliance and corruption have not
been previously linked to the issue of how the Court would be affected in a new
judicial environment of this kind. There has been no comprehensive analysis about
how EU member state corruption, recently described as ‘breathtaking’ in scope,
would affect the Court’s judicial independence. Equally absent is scholarly
discourse about fragmented opinions in the context of the nascent issue of member
state non-compliance with CJEU judgments. Until multi-disciplinary research and
in depth analysis identify a safe path for the Court to follow free from destructive
elements, a different route to greater transparency needs to be pursued. At the
present time, no such research and analysis exists.
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INTRODUCTION

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)2 has had a long-standing case
of dissent aversion. After six decades of successfully resolving disputes and
enforcing European community law among a growing number of EU member
states, the Court continues to issue only unsigned institutional judgments. These
judgments are the result of a simple majority vote presented as the collective voice
of the Court. Minority opinions are never disclosed to the public or even recorded.
Despite being part of the remarkable success of supranational adjudication in
Europe,3 the Court appears to be at odds with its sister transnational judicial
institutions4 and a majority of member state national courts which publish
dissenting opinion to some extent.
Although the debate about whether the CJEU should publish the separate opinions
of its judges in the common law way has been ongoing for decades,5 it appears to
have acquired new interest because of a recent amendment to the Treaty of the
European Union (TEU).6 Article 13 now contains what is arguably specific citizeninclusive language suggesting that the interests of the people are to be served by

The European Union’s Court has had periodic name changes since its inception in
1952, also known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) it is now formally called
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
2

3

Laurence R. Helfer, Anne Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication (1997), 107 Yale L.JU. 273.
4

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR).
5

Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, Juridical
International, VII (2003)162.
6

4

Also known as the Lisbon Treaty.

the EU’s institutional framework not just the national governments of the member
states. That the amendment may have been meant to address a transparency deficit
at EU institutions including the CJEU has not resonated at either the Court in
Luxembourg or at the European Parliament in Brussels.7 There is little
acknowledgement of it except for the work of a respected academic at the
University of Leeds in England whose writing suggests that Article 13 is meant to
engender trust in EU institutions of which the CJEU is one of the most powerful.8
To enhance trust, transparency is a prerequisite and dissenting opinion is offered as
the means to achieve it.9 This linking of transparency and trust to authority and
legitimacy arises because citizens appear to have greater faith in the ability of
institutions to serve them if they are able to examine all aspects of them.

7

Interviews with Court and parliamentary officials in both Luxembourg and
Brussels in November 5 and 6, 2013 disclosed no indication that Article 13 is
being considered along these lines at the present time. Officials at the secretariat
for the European Parliament Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee viewed
the change as a “housekeeping” amendment broadening out the language but
adding nothing new.
8

Lyiola Solanke, The Advocate General–Assisting the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to
Secure Trust and Democracy, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies,
Vol 14 (2011-2012) Article 13: “The Union shall have an institutional framework
which shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its interests,
those of its citizens and those of the member states, and ensure the consistency,
effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions.” (emphasis added) EU
institutions include the CJEU.
Solanke, supra. Dr. Solanke presents Article 13 as a signal to the EU’s
institutions that the interests of citizens are equal to the interests of the member
states themselves implying that the door has been left ajar for greater transparency
in judicial decision making at the CJEU as a key EU institution. Citing:D.
Gambetta cited in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘Trust, Honesty and Corruptions:
Reflection on the State-Building Process’: www.digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/lepp
papers/255.
9
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The pursuit of institutional transparency is a central theme of those favouring
dissenting opinion. So is the premise that judicial independence would be
enhanced if judges were able to voice their independent thoughts publicly. In fact,
the original premise for this thesis was that the CJEU should publish dissenting
opinion for those reasons. However, in the course of exploring the issue, an
unexpected and opposite conclusion emerged – the risks to CJEU independence,
authority and legitimacy are too substantial for the Court to pursue this perceived
route to greater transparency at this time.
By following the research, it became apparent that the CJEU is a complex judicial
institution; the only one in the world which delivers judgments binding on the
better part of a continent of sovereign nations. Those nations are distrustful of each
other and operate at uneven levels of democracy. What would happen to the
independence, authority and legitimacy of the CJEU if dissenting opinion and
public exposure to judges were introduced in its present environment is a question
which has not been adequately explored. That ‘present environment’ includes
widespread institutional corruption among EU member states.10
Endemic corruption is the proverbial elephant in the room during discussions about
introducing separate opinion practice at the CJEU and thereby exposing its
judiciary to public and other pressures. The CJEU is a youthful judicial institution
with 13 new states having joined the EU in the past decade alone.11 The member

10

European Union Anti-Corruption Report, (2014); Christopher Walker, The
Perpetual Battle, Corruption in the Former Soviet Union and the New EU
Members (2011), Centre for Public Policy, Freedom House. See also Nations in
Transition survey 2013.
11

The six original states: France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium,
The Netherlands and Luxembourg (1951), 22 other states have joined at various
times: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (1973); Greece (1984); Spain
and Portugal (1986); Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995); Cyprus, the Czech
6

state national courts fuel the EU law legal engine and give it authority and
legitimacy.12 With nearly half of the member states in transition as emerging
democracies, a change at the Court would produce unpredictable consequences.
Part of the unpredictability is how member states would respond to minority
opinions more favourable to their national interests. One possible outcome is the
use of dissenting opinions to legitimize non-compliance with adverse judgments.
Although dissenting opinion is at the centre of the pursuit of greater transparency
at the CJEU, safe, viable options with predictable outcomes have not been fully
explored either.
1.1 Rationale and Scope
This thesis explains why the CJEU is not ready to publish the separate opinions of
its judiciary as proponents suggest it should. It also explores whether introducing
dissenting opinion is even capable of resolving the perceived transparency deficit
at the CJEU13 since the value of transparency itself has been questioned.14

Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia (2004); Bulgaria and Romania (2007); Croatia (2013).
Michal Bobek, “Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the
Court of Justice Through the Eyes of National Courts,” in Judging Europe’s
Judges, the Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice, edited
by Maurice Adams, Henri de Waele, Johan Meeusen and Gert Strattmans, Hart
Publishing, 2014.
12

13

John Adler, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort (2000) Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies Vol. 20, No. 2, p.221… both U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Taft and
Justice Brandeis regarded dissenting opinion as unacceptably weakening the
doctrine of stare decisis, an underpinning of the common law and increasingly
important in the civil law system.
7

While there is enthusiasm among proponents about the prospect of introducing
separate opinions in terms of benefits, the risks of forging ahead in the absence of
empirical research and analysis disclosing probable not possible outcomes militate
against doing so. Before any steps toward introducing dissenting opinion practice
can be taken, meaningful interdisciplinary research is required. This thesis does not
provide that research. It focuses on far more modest tasks – identifying the risks
associated with introducing a change in practice at the CJEU in its present
circumstances and exploring where an invitation to publicly disagree might lead.
While there has been extensive, comprehensive empirical research on dissenting
opinion from many perspectives in the United States, this is not the case in
Europe.15 Few have waded into the murky waters of consequences for the CJEU, a
Court with a unique history, purpose and constituency.16
This thesis explores in juxtaposition judicial decision making practices at two
internationally respected institutions – the CJEU and the United States Supreme
Court. They are Courts with different legal traditions and practices operating on

14

Alberto Alemanno, Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law,
Transparency, Participation and Democracy, European Law Review
(forthcoming) 2014 @ p. 14 noting that the effects that transparency may have on
legitimacy have been little explored and dependent on the use made of disclosed
information and by whom.(cites also D. Curtin and A.J. Meijer, Does
Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?)
15

Katalin Kelemen, Dissenting Opinions in Constitutional Courts,German Law
Journal Vol. 14 No. 98 @ 1345. The author states that while there is “an extensive
literature in the United States regarding the use of dissenting opinion,
comprehensive empirical research is still absent in Europe.”
16

Some work has been done by the European Parliament through a study on
consequential issues but not on non-compliance and corruption.
8

opposite sides of a common ocean. American common law and continental civil
law inform the practices of each Court.
Despite differences and the peculiarities of the CJEU, the American experience
provides insight into what the European Court might expect from separate opinion
practice if it were to embark on a similar journey.
1.2 A Note on Structure
Before considering the CJEU as a judicial institution and what it has at stake if it
decided to introduce separate opinion practice in its present circumstances, the
nature, origins and capacity of dissenting opinion requires examination.
This thesis is divided into five chapters including its Introduction as Chapter 1.
Chapter 2: “Judicial Writing” offers an overview of practices and styles; why
divergent opinion developed deep roots in America and why unanimity became
entrenched in continental Europe; the advantages and disadvantages of dissenting
opinion and insights from the American experience. Chapter 3: “The Court in
Luxembourg” places the EU and the CJEU in historical context; identifies the
peculiarities of the Court; member state national court practices and points to the
uncertainties inherent in a change of practice. Chapter 4: “Judicial Independence”
discusses the challenges dissenting opinion poses for CJEU independence
including non-compliance and corruption as well as implications for CJEU
authority and legitimacy. Chapter 5: “Opening Pandora’s Box” offers reflections
and options.
2

JUDICIAL WRITING

The communication of rights and remedies arising from judicial adjudication has
been dominated by practices and styles rooted in history and circumstance
throughout the democratic world. Until the mid-19th century, two judgment styles

9

dominated – ‘seriatim’ the multiple judgment practice of England and ‘per curiam’
the unanimous decision style of continental Europe.
In its early years, the United States Supreme Court blended per curiam and
seriatim creating a ‘hybrid’ style which is uniquely American.17 This hybrid is
characterized by publication of a majority opinion of the Court together with any
dissenting and concurring opinions of individual judges.18 The CJEU issues per
curiam institutional judgments resulting from a majority vote.
The American Supreme Court’s ‘hybrid’ and the CJEU’s ‘per curiam styles are
grounded in two different legal systems – American adaptation of English common
law; and continental civil law.19 The vast majority of the EU member states are

17

In a seriatim court, each judge writes an individual opinion which collectively
comprise the judgment. This practice eliminates risk to collegiality caused by
dissenting opinion17 since there are no proverbial feathers to ruffle. However,
seriatim writing can be confusing since it is not always easy to discern what
principle the court is endorsing. In a per curiam court, a unanimous, single
unsigned majority decision is issued and published, the result of a vote among
participating judges comprises the opinion of the court as an institution. In a hybrid
court, individual opinions of the sitting judges’ are published as part of majority
judgments as the overall decision of the Court.
18

Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, Minnesota Law Review
lecture. Seriatim and per curiam are brought closer together by the middle ground
used prominently in North America.
19

The common law is based on statutory law and stare decisis established by
judicial decisions made in similar cases which over time have been compiled in
case reports. The common law is an adversarial system in which opposing parties
contest positions and judges adjudicate. A jury of one’s peers untrained in the law
decides the facts cases in which trial by a jury is available and the judge determines
the law to be applied, instructs the jury on it and any sentence. Continental civil
law is investigative or inquisitorial in nature. In a civil system, the judges’ role is to
10

civil law jurisdictions; the most widely employed legal system in the world.20
However there is evidence of some blurring between the lines with the common
law and civil law systems borrowing from each other.21
American separate writing is widely accepted as part of the common law decisionmaking process.22 Publishing alternate judicial opinion is not a general feature of
continental civil law. Common law judgments are detailed and expansive. Some of
them approach literary eloquence and both majority opinions and dissents are still
remembered if not cited many decades later. Common law judgments make
precedent-setting law which other lower judicial institutions must understand,
interpret and apply.
The civil law judgment is brief and ‘magisterial’ because judges engage in a
‘recitation’ of codified law. CJEU judges contribute less to shaping the law than

establish the facts of the case and apply the provisions of the relevant codified law
In a common law system, the judge’s decision is instrumental to the shaping of law
enacted by legislators; in the civil law system, law is shaped by the actual decisions
of legislators and legal scholars who draft the codes that determine the law; judges
interpret (or recite) the codified law.
20

BrightKnowledge.org. Civil law systems evolved from Roman law which was
used throughout the Roman Empire. Civil Law is used in most of Europe, Asia,
South America and most of Africa.
21

Common law separate opinions and more literary written reasons appear in the
national courts of the EU member states; Civil law codes such as uniform
commercial codes and labour codes are now in regular use in common law
systems.
22

M. T. Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent; (2007), Sup. Ct Rev. 283 (292-308.
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their common law counterparts and accordingly less attention appears to be paid to
their content and style.23
CJEU judgment writing has been described as “shallow, bland and unclear.”24
Despite this perspective, judicial brevity has its positive elements: “Writing that
makes its point briefly is more likely to be understood than writing that is lengthy...

23

Guy Canivet, Premier president honoraire de la Cour de cassation francaise,
member du Conseil constituionnel, The civil law system operates from a
comprehensive, continuously updated set of legal codes, with procedures and
appropriate penalties for offences clearly written and available explaining the way
civil law courts, unlike those in common law systems, give brief reasons for
judicial decisions. Using an example of an appellate court in the civil law system,
the French Court of Cassation, Monsieur Canivet explains: “The parties put a
number of questions called grounds of appeal to the court in a very formal manner
according to very precise rules and the court responds only to those questions…a
cassation judgment is a collection of responses to purely legal grounds of appeal
drawn from a decision given by a court of first instance or a court of appeal, known
as the juge du fond The Court of Cassation does not recount the facts of the case.
The cassation decision is not a narrative, nor does it provide a global statement of
reasons in response to the litigation. Instead it is a series of logical replies to legal
questions put to the court. . . When interpreting the law, the court does not have to
give the reasoning of the legislature; it cannot substitute itself as the legislature in
order to explain the meaning of the law in either a critical or probative manner.
Since the law is the expression of the general will, the court cannot add to,
transform or justify the general will. That is why, when the court interprets the law,
it reveals its meaning by purely and simply repeating the law.
Roger Alford, “Inferior Quality of ECJ Decisions” in Opinio Juris, (2007) web
blog dedicated to reports, commentary and debate on current developments and
scholarship in the fields of International law and politics.
24
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and forces the writer to think with precision by focusing on what he or she is trying
to say.”25
Accordingly, the objectives of American and European judgment writing reflect
the legal traditions and systems in which they operate.
2.1 Deeply Rooted Practices
The long era of European monarchial governance forms the underpinning for per
curiam practice26 still well represented in CJEU judgments.27 In a per curiam court,
a single unsigned majority decision is published, the result of a majority vote.
Other judges on the judicial panel who may have disagreed during deliberations
remain silent and defer to the majority opinion as required by their oath of office.
Although per curiam practice was adopted at the Court’s inception largely because
it was the practice of all six founding nations at the time, 21 member states, no

25

Judicial Writing Manual (1991), United States Federal Judicial Center, page 23.

“The will of the sovereign” is the underpinning of per curiam style - because the
sovereign could have but one will, unanimous judgments were required: Rosa
Raffaelli, Dissenting Opinions in the Supreme Courts of the Member States (2012)
citing: S. Cassesse, Leione sulla considdetta opinione dissenziente, in Quaderni
costituzionali, n. 4/2009,pp. 973-986. J. Malenovsky supra. Kings could accept or
reject findings of courts as a matter of right (eg. French Conseil d.’Etat and the UK
Privy Council).
26

27

This historical monarchial element of continental civil law was not foreign to
England. Until 2009 when the judicial function of the British House of Lords was
replaced with the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the link with the
sovereign was direct. Although appeals were heard in the House of Lords, they
were technically heard by “the Queen-in-Parliament.”
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doubt influenced by the Americans, now allow dissenting opinion as part of their
majority judgments. The CJEU continues publishing its judgments in per curiam
primarily because it produces a form of certainty as to result (which party
prevails). It leaves room for little, if any, interpretation which would arguably
differ among the 28 member states resulting in an uneven application of the
Court’s rulings.
In the early years of the American Supreme Court, judgments were issued seriatim
in the English way of individual judges writing separately even when they agree.28.
Seriatim judgments are notoriously confusing; it is often difficult to discern what
principle the court as an institution is endorsing.29
In America, Chief Justice John Marshall put an end to seriatim practice at the
Supreme Court concluding that individual reasons posed a risk to the Court’s
authority.30 He wanted a strong Supreme Court unlike his contemporary, President
Thomas Jefferson. Distrustful of judicial power,31 the President believed that

28

Law and Custom in Early Britain, Part I.

29

Lady Justice (Baroness) Brenda Hale (Deputy President of the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom) Judgment Writing in the Supreme Court, UKSC internet blog
(2010). The practice at the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which
opened in 2009, issues decisions in a variety of ways, seriatim, per curiam and
American hybrid. In its first year, the Court delivered 57 decided cases in which 20
were “judgments of the court” in which all the justice agreed; 11 in which there
was a single judgment with other justices agreeing, or a single majority with which
all majority judges agreed with separate views simply expressed as footnotes or
observations.
30
31

Chief Justice Marshall served from 1801 to 1935.

David N. Mayer, The Constitutional Thought of Thomas Jefferson, University
Press of Virginia, 1994, in which Thomas Jefferson is presented as distrustful of
the judicial power and opposing the judicial branch as final arbiter of the
14

unanimous judgments would empower the Court beyond what the founders had
intended.32 What evolved is something in between. Now the practice of publishing
judgments identifying the authors of majority, dissenting and concurring views is
entrenched at the United States Supreme Court and has been adopted in courts all
over the world to varying degrees.33

Constitution. In his mind this was not consistent with federalism. His view was not
shared by Chief Justice John Marshall who saw the United States Supreme Court
as “a guardian of the republic. Jefferson saw the role of the Supreme Court as
decider of what was good for Americans as too close to playing God. CJ Marshall
went on to decide the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison which established the
power of judicial review of government action and effectively empowered the
court and struck down the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act 180 during
Jefferson’s presidency. See also references to the American legal community and
general public skepticism about a powerful Supreme Court during Chief Justice
John Jay’s era fuelled in part by the majority decision in Chisholm v. Georgia
which did not favour State rights and led to the remedy of the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution (as it was at that time). See also Roscoe Pound’s
comments in The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 14 Am. Law 445 (1906).
32

Henderson, supra. President Jefferson had four reasons for preferring seriatim, it:
(i) increased transparency which led to more accountability (ii) ensured that each
judge had considered all the issues (iii) weighed the precedential value based on
the vote of the judges and (iv) acted as anti-precedent allowing future judges to
correct bad law.
33

The American hybrid developed initially at a slow pace and picked up
momentum during Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ long tenure as an associate
justice of the Court. He became the “great dissenter” despite his reputed dislike of
judicial disagreement. Judges appointed during President Roosevelt’s
administration enthusiastically issued dissenting opinions although for perhaps
more political reasons than the “important principles” which are said to have
inspired Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to dissent in Lochner v. New York (2005)
198 US 45.
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Although separate writing practice has grown exponentially since the 1940s, both
seriatim and per curiam have retained a presence at the American Supreme Court.
Per curiam has been described as a method of disposing of “controversial cases
without resolving controversial issues.”34 The unanimous judgment has authority.
President Jefferson and Chief Justice Marshall thought so in the early chapters of
America judicial experience. However, the Supreme Court has been criticized for
using these “nameless” judgments to do more than expressing “a narrow set of
opinions and dispositions in which formulaic, boiler plate language leaves no
legitimate room for individual expression” and for “hiding behind the cloak of
invisibility.”35 This language could be associated quite legitimately with the
judgments of the CJEU.
What per curiam sacrifices in insight into the decision-making process and
transparency, it gains in bringing “institutional strength to a controversial
decision.”36 This use of per curiam “demonstrates the justices’ awareness that

34

Laura Krugman Ray, The History of the Per Curiam Opinion: Consensus and
Individual Expression on the Supreme Court, vol. 27, issue 2, July 2002, p.187.
Brief appearances have been noted by seriatim in the early 1970s and again in
2000.34 Per curiam has remaining in regular use all along for limited purposes.
35

Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of Invisibility: The Supreme Court and
Per Curiam Opinions. Tulane Law Review, Vol. 86, (2012). The U.S. Supreme
Court’s use of per curiam opinion in recent years indicates a relatively consistent
pattern: In 2009, the Court recorded 19 institutional, unsigned decisions; 10 in
2010; 13 in 2011 and 5 in 2012.
36

Michelle Friedland, David Ham, Jeff Bleitch, Dan Ress and Aimee Feinberg,
Opinions of the Court By Anonymous, Supreme Court Watch, (2008). One of the
most prominent decisions of the United States Supreme Court requiring this level
of authority in the political and social circumstances of its day is the civil rights
decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. Had consensus not been
achieved addressing the highly divisive issue of desegregation in American
schools, the issue might have lingered causing ongoing domestic disruption and
16

anonymity can enhance institutional credibility.”37 This is one reasons why the
CJEU favours writing in per curiam – it delivers authoritative judgments which
leave no room for member states to interpret and apply decisions differently.
2.2 Opposing Opinions
Dissenting (opposing) opinion may be the most researched and analyzed issue in
the American judicial system second only, perhaps, to the way judges do their
work and think about it.38 A substantial amount of empirical data has been drawn
from the American federal appellate judiciary, in particular, the Supreme Court.
Yet, the practice is controversial even in America.

unrest. Other important decisions decided per curiam include: New York Times v.
the Unites States36- an important First Amendment case about freedom of news
agencies to publish the so-called “pentagon papers” during the Vietnam war;
Furman v. Georgia36 in which the Court issued a four-year moratorium on capital
punishment; United States v. Nixon36 which led to the first resignation of a sitting
president under threat of impeachment. In contrast the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore,36decided the outcome of the 2000 presidential election by a one-vote margin.
In that case, the Court was criticized for not ‘speaking with one voice’ and in
failing to do so, “undermined its authority’ with the outcome described as a
political not a judicial decision. (Alan Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice: How the
High Court Hijacked Election 2000, (2001) Oxford University Press.). See also, E.
MacFarlane, Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada, (2010),
52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 379 at p. 380. Per Curiam was used by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Referendum issue on whether the province could legally
secede from the rest of the country.
37

James Markham, Against Individual Signed Judicial Opinions (2006) Duke Law
Journal Vol. 56:923
38

In particular, Richard A. Posner How Judges Think (2008) Harvard University
Press which discusses various theories of judicial behavior. Also Espstein, Landes
and Posner, supra writing statistically about judicial behaviour.
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For every word in attribution, there is another in criticism. Lauded for their
capacity to incite thoughtful responses to the majority reasoning, dissents are also
described as “unfortunate,” even “tragic” occurrences.39 Judges who choose to
write separately are sometimes thought to be “out of step” with the views of the
times.40 Yet their opinions may be vindicated as social attitudes, economic climates
and political environments change and ultimately contribute to the development of
the law.41 In this way, such opinions become the “voice of the future,”42
strengthening political resolve to effect change43 by inspiring forward thinking

39

John Adler, Dissents in Courts of Last Resort: Tragic Choices? Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2000) @ 221 citing Justice Brennan, 37 Hastings
LJ 427 (1986) 427; and Lord Mansfield in Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 4 Burrows
2303 at 2395.
40

Mark Tushnet, I Dissent, Great Opposing Opinions in Landmark Supreme Court
Cases, (2008) Beacon Press, Boston.
41

Orr Larsen, supra citing: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev 281, 288 (1990) and Daniel A. Farber, The Rule
of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev 1173 (2005); Kevin M.
Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L.J.2235 (1996).
See also, Andrew Lynch, Taking Delight in Being Contrary, Worried About Being
a Loner or Simply Indifferent: How Do Judges really feel About Dissent? Federal
Law Review Vol. 32, p. 311, (2004) in which he reviews a book by Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (2003), Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, former puisne (associate) justice, Supreme Court of
Canada, The Dissenting Opinion Voice of the Future? No stranger to dissenting
opinion, she described dissenting opinions as rich sources of all that is possible in
the law; they play three roles (i) prophecy (ii) dialogue (iii) safeguard the integrity
of the judicial decision-making process and ultimately the law.
43
Tushnet, supra @ p. 92
42
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legislators to enact progressive or corrective legislation. However, there is
scholarly research suggesting this occurs “with minimal frequency.”44
Dissenting opinion has also been described as an antidote to conformity unchecked
by contrarian views resulting in “astonishing outcomes.”45 They can also “cancel
the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of judges so
largely depends.”46 They may also be “symptoms of dysfunction” by “exposing
internal divisions publicly.”47
Separate opinion writing on the one hand invites open disagreement on a judicial
panel even if the opinions are framed respectfully.48 They may endanger the

44

Andrew Lynch, The Intelligence of A Future Day, (2005) 33 Federal Law
Review 485. An empirical study on activity over a 22-year period (1981 to 2003)
on the impact of dissenting opinion in the Australia’s highest court may provide
some insight. Dissenting opinion in the High Court of Australia is focused on the
hope that eventually the question at issue will be revisited. The opinions
themselves speak directly to a comprehensive justification for an alternative
resolution by “appealing to the intelligence of a future day”. The Study concludes
that “redemption of minority opinion occurs with minimal frequency—far less
often than is popularly believed.” However, the study did demonstrate that
dissenting opinion “exerts some level of influence” over the law.
45

Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, (2003) 1 Harvard University
Press.
46
47

Henderson supra referring to Justice Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958).

Henderson supra, referring to the commencement address U.S. Supreme Court
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered to the Georgetown University Law School,
Class of 2006, indicated he believes dissent is a “symptom of dysfunction”.
48
Harvard, From Consensus To Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful”
Dissent, supra.
19

authority, prestige49 and legitimacy of the Court or at least the decision rendered.50
On the other hand, publishing dissents brings “clarity and authority to judgments
and have the power to “move ordinary people.”51
On a global plane, general principles of international law appear to support
publication of dissenting opinions52 because of the substantial contribution to be
made to transparency which permeates all institutional structures and maintains a
prominent focus.53
With all of its divided support, advantages and disadvantages, separate opinions
have a not necessarily welcome companion – concurrences. These lead to
fragmented judgments with pluralities (no-clear majorities). “When a concurring
justice endorses the Court’s judgment but elects to offer an independent opinion,
the result may be a judgment unsupported by a majority rationale.”54
Plurality opinions most often arise in civil rights and civil liberties cases which,
because of the human element and societal implications, are the most ‘emotionally

49

Prestige of the court is expressed as public confidence in some common law
jurisdictions, Canada for example.
50

The argument of the CJEU canvassed in the 2012 Study conducted on behalf of
the European Parliament.
51

Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court 2007 Term, Harvard Law Review Vol. 122:4
(2008).
52

Raffaelli, supra citing Malenovsky, Les opinions separees et leurs repercussions
sur l’independence du juge international, in Anuario Colombiano de Derecho
Constitucional, 2010, at 39 and p 31 with respect to the “growing trend”.
Carlos I. Fuentes, “Transparency as a Global Goal: Towards a Unity of
Principles in Global Administrative Law,” Research Gate (2008).
53

54

Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by
the Rehnquist Court [1990] University of California, Davis Vol. 23-777 @ 811.
20

charged and uniquely revealing of the justices’ personal feelings’.55 The CJEU
equivalent would be social issues involving values, culture and perhaps history.
CJEU judges are no more immune to judicial disagreement related to personal or
national ethos than judges of the American Supreme Court. American judges are
protected from judicial interference in a variety of ways including life tenure. The
equivalent protection for CJEU judges reposes in the fact that differences in their
opinions are not disclosed. That protection would disappear if dissenting opinion
was introduced without being replaced with something of equal strength.

2.3 Lessons From America
As the great home of the dissenting opinion, the American Supreme Court’s long
history and experience with separate judicial writing offers insight to the CJEU.56
Judicial dissenting opinion has had general public acceptance in America for
generations even in decisions of national importance.57 Levels of consensus at the

55

Markham, supra citing the 1989 flag burning case Texas v. Johnson, (1089) 492
US 397 in which Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring note about the personal toll
of such an issue. Markham also notes the more recent decision of Lawrence v.
Texas (2003), 539 UD 558 in which Scalia J. “tempered his dissent with a personal
disclaimer: ‘Let me be clear that I have nothing against homosexuals, or any other
group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means.’ See also
Pamela C. Corley, Udi Sommer, Amy Steigerwalt & Artemus Ward, Extreme
Dissensus: Explaining Plurality Decisions on the United States Supreme Court,
The Justice System Journal.
The first ‘true dissent’ was penned in 1806: James Markham, Against Individual
Signed Judicial Opinions (2006) Duke Law Journal Vol. 56:923 citing Paterson J’s
dissent in , in Simms & Wise v. Slacum, (1806) 7 US (3 Cranch) 300.
56

57

Recent examples include Bush v. Gore 1 148 L. Ed. 2nd 388 (2000) resolving the
dispute between the parties in the presidential election that year; District of
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Supreme Court have reached 50% fairly routinely58 prompting some scholars to
conclude that America’s top judicial institution is becoming a seriatim court.59
What motivates judges in courts of final review to write separately is linked to the
choices that must be made from a platter of ‘competing yet compelling’ solutions60

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) in which the Supreme Court held that a
citizens have a right to possess a firearm for lawful purposes, which right is
protected by the second Amendment; and the 2010 Affordable Health Care Act
decision in which the Act was substantially upheld although four judges did so on
the basis of commerce and taxation, the Chief Justice on taxation and four would
have struck it down.
58

A recent study tracks in percentiles dissenting practices between the
commencement of the court of Chief Justice John Marshall (1801) and Chief
Justice John Roberts (2005). The proclivity rates disclose that the lowest dissenting
period of all time was during Chief Justice Marshall’s 34 years on the Supreme
Court (1801-1835) at 4%. This was followed by 10% on average over the next
century until Chief Justice Stone’s era (1941-1945) at 27%; followed by a sharp
increase to 48% under Chief Justice Vinson (1946-1952); 50% under Chief Justice
Warren (1953-1968; 59% under Chief Justice Burger (1969-1985); 56% under
Chief Justice Rehnquist (1986-2005); and 47% during the two-year-period of the
study (2005-2007) under Chief Justice Roberts.
59

Thomas G. Walker, Seriatim Opinions in the Oxford Companion to the United
States Supreme Court; Henderson, supra See also Markham, supra, who notes the
“shift from the institutional to the personal nature of opinion writing …evidence in
Justice Breyer’s subtle and inadvertent rhetorical slip in South Central Bell v
Alabama, (1999) 526 US 160 when he used the pronoun ‘I’ instead of ‘we’ in a
majority opinion.
60

Lynch, supra @ p. 320. Professor Lynch cites: Ian Greene, Peter McCormick,
George Szablowski, Martin Thomas, Carl Baar, Final Appeal, Decision-Making in
Canadian Courts of Appeal (1998) in which empirical data from Canadian judges
confirmed four such factors: the law in the context of the issues to be resolved,, the
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and maximizing public policy preferences.61 There is also the dilemma in which a
judge firmly believes in ‘one true answer’ and therefore must a dissent.62
Whatever the motivation for the decision to write separately (a subject beyond the
scope of this thesis and fully analyzed elsewhere)63 no one seriously advocates
stifling the exercise of freedom of expression through contrarian views at the
Supreme Court. However, there is a call in some quarters for the elimination of
concurring and plurality opinions because they contribute to dissension on the
Court.64 Others advocated restraint65 while recognizing that dissenting opinions
often make an important contribution. However, either restricting or limiting
dissenting opinion may undermine judges’ rights of freedom of expression just as
much as not allowing them at all.

personal values of the judges, the procedures developed by the court in question,
the nature of interpersonal judicial relations in the court.
61

Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, The Choices Judges Make, Congressional Quarterly
Press (1998).
62

Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, California Law
Review, Coll. 100:519, discussing different types of judicial self-restraint.
63

Posner, supra and in various other books and publications.

64

Linas Ledebur, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a Divided Supreme
Court, (2009), Penn State Law Review vol. 113:3, 899 @920.
65

Allison Orr Larsen, supra citing: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev 281, 288 (1990) and Daniel A. Farber, The Rule
of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev 1173 (2005); Kevin M.
Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 Yale L.J.2235 (1996).
Also, Justice Ruth Bader-Ginsburg referring to Justice Brandeis’ comments:
“random dissents” weaken the institutional impact of the Court and handicap it in
the doing of its fundamental job….need to be saved for major matters if the Court
is not to appear indecisive and quarrelsome”. . . “his shots[were] all the harder
because he chose his ground.”
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The Court’s low level of consensus remains a source of uneasiness because of its
implications for the Supreme Court’s credibility and legitimacy. 66 The steady diet
of one-vote majorities and pluralities are particularly troublesome for institutional
legitimacy.67
The Supreme Court’s plurality opinions create muddled and fragmented decisions;
have the potential to raise more questions than they answer; and confuse the
current state of the law.68 They have been blamed for a “divisive and weakened
Court,69 creating uncertainty for the bench and bar. They routinely leave the lower

66

Chief Justice John Roberts in the New Republic interview with Jeffrey Rosen,
2006. Although Chief Justice Roberts has expressed hopes of achieving greater
consensus on the Court, even at 47%, the present level of dissent is not the highest
in the Court’s history. During Chief Justice Burger’s term, the rates rose to nearly
56% as the statistics disclose (Henderson, supra). The task of reversing the trend
may be an uphill battle since dissent, once reserved for profound differences of
opinion, are now routine.
Bader Ginsburg, supra. Even during Justice Holmes’ tenure, dissents were
recognized as taking a toll on institutional legitimacy. See also Markham, supra
discussing Justice Brandeis’ penchant for withholding separate opinions from
publication ‘so as not to inhibit the Court’s decisiveness.’
67

68

Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality
Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective. Journal of Law & Policy [2000]
Vol. 4:261 @ 284. From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the
“Respectful” Dissent; Harvard Law Review (2011) Vol. 124: 1305@ 1306.
Hochschild, supra. John F. Davis, & William L. Reynolds, Juridicial Cripples:
Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, (1974) Duke L.J. 59, 62.
69

Ledebur, supra. David Paul Kuhn, Chief Political Correspondent for
RealClearPolitics writing online: “The Polarization of the Supreme Court, 2 July
2010:“The “supreme” authority of the high court rests on its legitimacy. The more
absent consensus is from the high court, the more diminished its legitimacy and the
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courts at their own devices on how the judgments should be interpreted or applied,
if at all, and with what authority.70 The Supreme Court itself has declared a
solution although not one which is fully effective.71
Although the Supreme Court operates in a “polarized” and “politicized”
environment, there is no question that it still commands the trust of the American
people.72 However, the “supreme authority” of the Court rests on its legitimacy
and scholars point out that the more consensus is absent, the more diminished is its
legitimacy and the more each decision will come to be viewed through a “political
lens.”73 Considering the fact that a common law court’s principal function is to set
binding, uniform precedent, the question arises as to whether the Court is failing to
do so when it issues a plurality opinion making it difficult if not impossible to
discern its governing rationale.74

more each decision will come to be viewed through a political lens”. Kuhn also
opines that 5-4 decisions which are routine at the Court are also those most likely
to be overturned by later Supreme Courts.
70

.James F. Spriggs & David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, (2011) The
Georgetown Law Journal Vol. 99:515. The authors point to the comments by Chief
Justice Rehnquist [Remarks on the Process of Judging, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
263, 270, (1992)] and Justices Lewis Powell and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
71

United States v. Marks (1977) 430 U.S.188, 193. (The holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those judges who concurred on the narrowest
grounds). The application of this principle has its own challenges.
72

Gallup poll- 63% of participating Americans in 2011 disclosed that they had a
“great deal” or “fair amount” of faith in the Court.72 It was however, the lowest
statistical percentile on the same questions since 1976.
73
74
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Kuhn, supra. Ledebur, supra.
Corley, Sommer, Steigerwalt & Ward, supra.

Although dissents at their best improve the quality of a court’s judgments, increase
transparency and enhance freedom of judicial expression, in the CJEU’s judicial
environment they could be destructive.75 A track record of low consensus similar
to the experience of the United States Supreme Court could be alarming at a Court
which delivers binding judgments to a continent of nations.76 Nevertheless,
dissenting opinions do demonstrate that more than one result is possible.77 They
can give judges a wide berth of expression78 in the right case and in the right court.
However, the ‘right court’ at the present time does not include the CJEU.
3

THE COURT IN LUXEMBOURG

History provides context for almost everything. The EU and the CJEU were
created for the specific purpose of pursuing European integration in a post war era.

Remi van de Calseijde, “Improvement or Gilding the Lily’? – The desirability of
Introducing Judicial Dissent at the European Court of Justice, in Vol. 1, The
Institutional Functioning of the EU, 2010-2011, Maastricht Centre for European
Law, Maastricht University Faculty of Law.
75

76

In the case of the CJEU, rates of dissent such as recorded in the recent past at the
U.S. Supreme Court might actually destabilize a legal system which was crafted to
promote a collegial framework to avoid the kinds of conflict which have in other
eras (pre WWII) torn Europe apart.
77

Michael Boudin, Friendly, J., Dissenting, Duke Jaw Journal Vol. 61:881. Judge
Friendly was a highly respected member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit and a frequent dissenter.
78

Chief Justice Bora Laskin of Canada (1972-1984) spoke of dissenting opinion
this way: “A judge never writes more freely than when he writes in dissent, The
Constitutional Character of the Judge, Israel Law Review 7 (1972):340. He also
recorded more dissenting opinions than any Chief Justice in Canada’s historyPhilip Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law To Life (2005), The Osgoode Society for
Canadian Legal History, University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Chapter 20.
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Treaties have empowered the Court by making its decisions binding on all of the
member states uniformly thereby creating a hierarchy in EU judicial adjudication
with the CJEU at the apex. However, the Court also draws its authority and
legitimacy from the member states individually and collectively through their
acceptance of its judgments. Because of this, the Court is vulnerable to member
state refusal to comply with them.
3.1 A Blueprint for Peace
The European Union and the CJEU owe their very existence to the devastating
destruction of Europe caused by two world conflicts 21 years apart. Instrumental in
their establishment were the efforts of two French political figures who understood
the potential for a renewed cycle of war and revenge in Europe that a re-built
Germany and an anxious France might present. They devised a plan to make war
“not only unthinkable but materially impossible.”79 The blueprint for peace they
devised integrated the coal and steel industries which were the primary
commodities used for the production of war munitions at that time.80 The
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community by the Treaty of Paris in
1951 was the first step towards not only integration of commodities but Europe

79

In addition to Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman of France, there was a
substantial list of European leaders identified as the EU “Founding Fathers.”
See Franco Piodi, From the Schuman Declaration to the Birth of the ECSC: the
Role of Jean Monnet, Archive and Documentation Centre, directorate-general for
the Presidency European Parliament, specifically from text of the Schuman
Declaration, 9 May 1950, Paris.
The blueprint design named the “Shuman Plan” was to place Franco-German
production of coal and steel under a common “High Authority” (since 1961, the
European Parliament) within the framework of an organization open to the
participation of other European states. The handling of coal and steel production
was meant to level the playing field shifting focus among participating nations to
economic unification and wellbeing among the member states.
80
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itself into the present European Union.81 Today there are 28 EU member states
comprising a population in excess of 500 million. The EU is now on its way to
becoming a new superpower.82
In addition to the formation of what became the EU as a political entity, a
mechanism was required to resolve disputes. It was predicted at the time that the
EU Court would “eventually become the Supreme Court of a European
Federation”83 enabled by Treaties, the rule of law and democratic principles. The
CJEU takes claim to that legacy.
3.1 No Ordinary Court
The CJEU has been described as “no ordinary court” because of its unique
circumstances.84 One of the Court’s more remarkable features is the fact that 28
independent countries have relinquished some of their sovereignty to join the EU.
By doing so, they accepted the hierarchical authority of the CJEU over their
national supreme courts in the interpretation and scope of EU law. Treaties link
and legally bind these sovereign nations to each other politically, financially and

81

European Integration started with six original nations and has now grown to 28,
with Croatia the most recent member state joining in July 2013. The treaty
arrangements continued after 1951. See also Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union?
An Introduction to European Integration, (1999), Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillanFranco Piodi, supra.
82

T. R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower And the End of
American Supremacy, Penguin Group (USA) 2005. Reid is a syndicated columnist
and investigative journalist for the Washington Post.
83

Werner Feld, The Judges of the Court of Justice of the European Communities,
Villanova Law Review Vol. 9, p.37 (1963).
84

Mai Sloth, The European Court of Justice: The right institution to safeguard
legal predictability? Aarbus University, Denmark, Department of Business Law,
(2009).
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socially as well as to a judicial tribunal which might, and often does, issue rulings
contrary to their individual national interests.85
Because the CJEU was not created by a national constitution, it cannot be evenly
compared to other international courts.86 Unlike the United States, the EU is
neither a federation nor a sovereign state.87 Its members retain and exercise
sovereignty of their own. Many come from different legal traditions and remain
states in transition with the durability of their emerging democracies in question.88
Although the experience of other Courts offers insight, there is little to share about
how a change in Court practice might be received by such a diverse group of
member states.89 Even the ICJ and ECtHR offer little insight because the decisions
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The CJEU differs from other courts because of the broad reach of its decisions
binding on all member states not just the disputing parties and the fact it belongs to
a political community which do not exist outside the supranational environment
See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create
International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, (2005), 93 Cal.
L. Rev.
86

The International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights
which are also supranational courts do not provide good comparisons either since
they deliver judgments and rulings binding only on the parties not multiple states.
87

Anna Bundzen, The United States Supreme Court and the European Court of
Justice, A Comparative Study of Compliance, Orebro University, (2011). The EU
has been described as something in between a federation and a confederation.
Christopher Walker, “The Perpetual Battle – Corruption in the Former Soviet
Union and the New European Union Members”
88

89

Raffaelli, supra. Dr. Raffaelli conducted the study for the Directorate-General of
Internal Policies, European Parliament on whether the CJEU statute should be
amended to allow its judiciary to publish separate opinions along with majority
judgments.
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that make affect only the parties to the dispute, not multiple disparate sovereign
states.
Statutory support enables the Court to set its own rules of procedure. If, for
example, the Court chose to introduce dissenting opinion, it would generate draft
amendments to its own governing legislation for consideration by the European
Parliament. The Court has not yet sought any such amendment.90
The CJEU was originally established as an administrative tribunal. However, the
Treaty of Rome in 1957 enlarged the Court’s role91 by giving it full adjudication
capacity including the power to make preliminary rulings on the scope and
meaning of European Law and hearing allegations against member states for noncompliance with Treaty and other obligations.92 The Court’s judgments legally

90

Interviews conducted November 5, 6, 2013 in Luxembourg and Brussels with
senior officials at the Office of the Registrar of the CJEU at the Secretariat of the
European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs.
91
92

Article 220, the Treaty of Rome.

The Treaty of Europe (Lisbon) (2010) amended (but did not replace) the Treaty
on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
2007. It came into force two years later. The principal Treaties from which the
CJEU draws its authority are: The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See Europa.eu for a full
outline of the basis for EU law. Treaties also include: Brussels Treaty 1948; Paris
Treaty 1951; Modified Brussels Treaty 1954; Rome Treaties 1957; Merger Treaty
1965; European Council Conclusion 1975; Schengen Treaty 1985; Single
European Act 1986; Maastricht Treaty 1992; Amsterdam Treaty 1997; Nice Treaty
2003; Lisbon Treaty 2007 (also known as the TEU) See consolidated treaty 2010.
The TEU and TFEU constitute the treaties on which the EU was founded. Notable
EU Treaties: The Treaty of Paris (1951) (the Coal and Steel Treaty – the
foundation treaty); The Treaty of Rome (1957) signed by the six founding Nations
leading to the European Economic Community (1958); Maastricht Treaty (1992)
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binding on the national courts of all member states provides uniformity of law
throughout the EU.93 The CJEU has also bolstered its own jurisdiction by
establishing legal concepts previously unknown in either common or civil law –
the doctrines of “supremacy”94 and “direct effect.”95

formally created the EU and laid the foundation for Eurozone (the world’s largest
trading area); Amsterdam Treaty (1997) defined EU citizenship and individual
rights to justice, freedom and security and commenced reforms of the EU
(ongoing); Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007; ratified( 2009), in furtherance of
Amsterdam Treaty reform out of which came the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU) which organizes the functioning of the EU and
arrangements for exercising its areas of competence.
93

A request for a preliminary ruling is required by Article 234. National supreme
courts are not permitted to rule on the interpretation or scope of EU law. If an issue
arises in a national court proceeding on a question “necessary to give judgment” in
the case, that court must request a ruling from the CJEU and once the ruling is
made, apply it in the case before it. Requests for a preliminary ruling empower the
CJEU to rule on the interpretation of treaties; the validity and interpretation of
statutes and acts of the institutions of the EU.
94

The Supremacy doctrine was established by the European Court of Justice (as it
then was called) in response to Article 220 of the TEU, requiring the Court to
“ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is
observed”. This was interpreted to mean ECJ decisions take precedence over
Member State national courts in the areas in which it has jurisdiction, most often
resolving conflicts between State and EU law.
95

The doctrine of Direct Effect requires member states to apply EU law
domestically and allow individual citizens to invoke EU law against each other and
not just the State. This has been interpreted to mean ECJ decisions take precedence
over member state national courts in the areas in which it has jurisdiction, most
often resolving conflicts between State and EU law. The doctrine of “supremacy”
grants CJEU and EU law precedence over any and all conflicting member state
legislation including both constitutional and general domestic law.
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To be accepted into the EU sphere, new countries must demonstrate a commitment
to the rule of law and democracy by establishing and maintaining democratic
institutions.There is little doubt that the CJEU has become an “unusually
influential international court.” Its work is essential for the application of the rule
of law in Europe and helps knit the member states more tightly together.96 Unlike
other courts, the CJEU has the authority to strike down both EC and member state
national law which it determines to be inconsistent with EU Treaties.97
Although the Court has an important role to play in the EU, the way it carries out
its business has not engendered acceptance in all quarters because its proceedings
and judgments are not subject to greater scrutiny. Further, the CJEU has been
criticized for failing to achieve greater legal certainty and predictability in Treaty
interpretation and application.98
The CJEU is comprised of three separate tribunals which convene in
Luxembourg.99 However, it is the work of the Court of Justice which produces the
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Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra.

Karen J. Alter, Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”: European Governments
and the European Court of Justice, (1998) International Organizations, 52, 1,
Winter, (998) p. 121-47. Fritz Scharpf interviewing Hans Bockler Stiftung, online.
97

98

Sloth, supra. See also Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European
Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking, Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers (1986).
99

Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World,
Routledge: London (2002) fn. 68. The present CJEU comprises three courts: the
Court of Justice (1952) the General Court (1989)and Civil Service Tribunal (2005),
references here to the CJEU refer to the Court of Justice in its distinct capacity as
the EU’s highest court. The largest percentage of CJEU work comes from
mandatory referral from national courts on a ‘preliminary reference.’ The national
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vast majority of judgments contributing to the development of EU law and the
focus here. The judicial complement is comprised of judges nominated by each of
the member states who are then appointed to six-year renewable terms.100 Each
judge is required to sit as an independent member of the Court and not as a home
state representative.101 Decisions are made by the full (plenary) court; a Grand
Chamber of about 13 judges who hear the important preliminary references; and
chambers of three to five judges.102 The Court structure includes the Office of the
Advocates General. AGs are quasi-judicial officers who analyze the cases and
present arguments as the Court’s amici.103 There are presently eight AGs serving

supreme courts have no jurisdiction to resolve an issue about EU law including
treaty interpretation or scope. They must await and apply a CJEU ruling.
100

With the admission of Croatia to the EU in July 2013, the Court complement
rose to 28. Because the Court sits in an uneven number, the tradition is that one
judge stands down, usually the most junior member of the court present.
101

Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Court of Justice of the European Union, (2013)
Oxford Studies in European Law, Chapter 7.
The European Court of Justice – Governance Watch website. The full court
hears cases of “exceptional importance” such as proceedings to dismiss the
European Ombudsman, Member of the European Commission (the EU governing
body), or removing a judge who is not fulfilling his/her duties. The Grand
Chamber hears preliminary rulings on treaty interpretations and scope and direct
actions (alleged failure of a state to fulfil obligations). Of the 544 cases completed
between 2007 and 2011, the full court heard one case, the Grand Chamber heard
62; Chambers courts of five judge heard 300; chambers of three heard 177 cases
and the president of the court determine the result in four cases. 102 Most of the
decisions made by the CJEU are heard by courts comprised of five and three
judges (87.69%).
102

103

Mitchel de S.-O-l’E Lasser in Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis
of Transparency and Legitimacy, Oxford University Press, (2004) fn 42. AGs have
been part of the court structure since 1957 when the Court’s jurisdiction was
expanded by the Treaty of Rome.
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the Court. The AG role is defined using similar language in various EU treaties:
“to present the public with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned
conclusions on cases submitted to the court of justice with a view to assisting
[judges] in the performance of their duties” and to function only in the “interests of
justice.”104
The AG opinion is the personal view of the lawyer writing it and is therefore
considered to be independent. Nevertheless, these opinions are not generally
considered to be a ‘true substitute’ for separate opinions as they are sometimes
viewed.105 Unlike the Court’s brief and stilted writing practice, the AG opinion is
similar to the more expansive reasoning of the American Supreme Court.106
Although the AG opinion may be a filtering process in which opinions are
independently given with no requirements that the judges adopt or follow them,
they provide insight into decisions of the Court.107 They are released to the public
in advance of the Court’s published judgment. A high percentage of AG opinions

104

The AG role is defined in various treaties: Euratom Treaty Article 138;
European Economic Community Treaty, Article 166; European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty Article 32a, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Article 252.
105

Raffaelli, supra.

106

M. Rosenfeld, Comparing constitutional review by the European Court of
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court, International Journal of Constitutional Law,
Article 252, Vol 4.2006, 616-651. It is also seen as a less confrontational and more
respectful style.
107

Solanke supra, discussing the role of advocates general in assisting the Court by
preparing opinions about how the issues might be resolved as a first level of
problem solving. The role of AGs is sometimes likened to the role fulfilled by trial
courts. The judges review the opinions along with other materials before the Court
and are not required to rely on them although they are often important to the
ultimate decision.
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mirror the conclusion of the Court. With or without AG advance opinion, CJEU
decisions are presented as majority judgments of the Court whether there has been
true consensus or otherwise. The working language of the Court is French and
many judgments are translated into as many as 23 different languages.108 In a
multi-lingual and transnational environment, the production of thousands of pages
of Court documents and judgments annually is “a necessary fact of life” at the
Court.109 Practicalities often determine outcomes. Introducing separate opinion in
the judgments of the CJEU has a financial implication reflected in the substantial
cost of translation services.
3.2 An Odd Phenomenon
The CJEU’s practice of disallowing dissenting opinion in its judgments has been
described as “an odd phenomenon in an era [of] visible and communicating
governments, judicial institutions included.”110
Despite the apparent lack of interest in the subject in Luxembourg, the European
Parliament commissioned a study to assess the suitability of introducing dissenting
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The official language of the Court is French. There are 23 languages use in the
EU. While many languages are used from time to time, it is more common for
three to five to be translated: Interviews with officials in the Office of the
Registrar, CJEU, Luxembourg, November 5, 2013.
109

Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston, Q.C., during European Union Committee
hearings on the workload of the CJEU (2011), reported on line.
Rasmussen, supra. Dr. Rasmussen has described the “frequent poor reasoning”
of the Court as one of its defects which is not acceptable in an era in which the
right to know is important in governance and governmental institutions. The
Court’s ‘unanimous’ opinions are also question as to whether there is true
unanimity, a simple majority or forced consensus is a question without an answer
given the structure and practices of the Court.
110
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opinion.111 Released in November 2012, the study focused on the advantages and
disadvantages of separate opinions and the experience of member states supreme
courts and other international courts to some extent. Fifteen member states were
polled on whether they would favour introducing dissenting opinion at the
CJEU.112 A separate survey on the practice of the (then) 27 EU member states
disclosed that seven national courts do not allow separate opinions at all; one state
allows it only in non-constitutional cases; six allow it only in constitutional cases;
but only 13 allow it in all cases.113
The study acknowledges that transparency and openness are values favoured
within the EU institutional structure but concludes that publishing dissenting
opinion at the CJEU would have to be undertaken only “with restraint and with
respect in a way that maintains collegiality of the Court.” This might be what is
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Raffaelli, supra.
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Solanke, supra. Dr. Solanke conducted a partial poll among the member states
which indicates that nine favoured it (Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain,
UK, Ireland, Greece, Portugal; and six did not (France, Italy, Netherlands,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria). The division of thought falls between those
countries which allow dissenting opinion and those who strictly follow the
continental civil law and do not. Not surprisingly, five of the original six founding
states were against it choosing to adhere to the favoured civil law tradition.
Although most member states allow their Supreme Court judges to issue separate
opinions, practices vary widely with some restricting the dissents to constitutional
issues and others allowing it only in non-constitutional cases.
113

Raffaelli, supra. The study includes a table disclosing this information.
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Austria do not
allow it at all; Ireland allows it for (ordinary) non-constitutional cases only; Czech
Republic, Germany, Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia allow it only in
constitutional cases and those which allow separate opinions in all cases are:
Bulgaria Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Cyrus, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom.
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often referred to as the “respectful dissent.”114 It is unlikely that the practice of the
United States Supreme Court with its one-vote margins and pluralities would be
acceptable in either Brussels or Luxembourg.
The study also expresses a cautionary note. Although including published
dissenting opinions could enhance the Court’s “level of democratization,” it might
also have “unforeseen consequences.” These could include unexpected responses
from member states leading to inconsistent application of the law in the national
courts breaking down CJEU authority and conduct which would undermine
judicial independence.
How member states would respond to fragmented judgments is unknown. The
experience of other supranational courts, the ICJ and ECtHR, is not helpful either
since the decisions of those courts bind only the parties to the dispute.
In addition to its odd phenomenon, the Court’s writing style has been criticized for
its want of clarity.115 One scholar suggests that by changing its single collegiate
judgment style, the Court would be forced to rethink its written work which reads
like “documents drafted by a committee” and are “overly abstract, vague and
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Laura Krugman Ray in Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, Brooklyn Law
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my duty to express my dissent: (Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 US 45. Justice
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elliptical.”116 This is weighed against the argument that the purpose of a CJEU
judgment is to provide a definite answer to a specific legal question; not to open up
discussions about other ways to interpret the law.117 In any event, whenever CJEU
judgment writing arises, transparency is central to the discussion.
3.3 An Uncertain Path
Over the last few decades, transparency has become a democratic gold standard for
political and public administration globally entrenched as it is in the understanding
that it enhances trust in public institutions.118 Transparency is a measure of the
“quality of authoritativeness of an institution, action or actor.”119 It has been
identified as a remedy for the challenges of modern government: inefficiency,
corruption and bad performance.120
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Solanke, supra. It is a ‘self-evident’ social good. Amitai Etzioni, Is
Transparency the Best Disinfectant? The Journal of Political Philosophy (2010),
George Washington University.
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Basak Cali, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of the European
Court of Human Rights: The View From The Ground, University College
London,(2011) citing M. Weber 1978, Economy and Society 2 Vols. (trans. and
ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills) Oxford University Press, New York; D. Beetham.
1993. In Defence of Legitimacy, Political Studies XLI:488-91.
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Jenny de Fine Licht, Daniel Naurin, Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, Does
Transparency Generate Legitimacy? An experimental study of procedure
acceptance of open-and closed-door decision making, University of Gothenburg
Working Paper Series 2011.
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Although transparency is valued by the CJEU, the path to achieving it is tangled
and uncertain. Proponents of greater transparency rely on the argument that the
Court’s present practices make the judiciary inaccessible. In addition, the Court is
said to be at odds with member state supreme courts, the ICJ in The Hague and the
ECtHR in Strasbourg. Proponents point to the example of the American Supreme
Court which achieves the ultimate in judicial transparency by publishing separate
opinions routinely; nonplussed by one-vote majorities and pluralities. Unlike the
Supreme Court, an institution with a single national audience well-steeped in the
rule of law and democracy, the CJEU speaks to a motley collection of states. Many
of those states are emerging democracies with transition issues.
Although few dispute the benefits of transparency as a disincentive to bribery and
other challenges in the general public sector, the judicial institution is a special
case. The link between transparency and greater authority and legitimacy of the
Court is less clear and little explored.121 At the very least, it may simply facilitate
the functional benefit of access to information, documents and records, thereby
providing administrative openness.122 Transparency’s link to legitimacy may be
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Alemanno, supra citing D. Curtin and A.J. Meijer, Does Transparency
Strengthen Legitimacy? A Critical Analysis of European Union Policy Documents
(2006), SSRN.
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The CJEU has embraced releasing court administrative documents and records
on the internet but it has stopped of publishing the separate opinions of its judges
and their voting records. This protection of the Court’s authority and legitimacy is
bolstered by Article 15 of the TFEU which exempts the CJEU and EU banking
institutions expect “when exercising their administrative tasks.” Article13 of the
Lisbon Treaty may add to the transparency debate because of the reference to
rights of citizens. Whether the intention was to clarify or expand rights,
transparency and openness are sufficiently important concepts to appear in
multiple treaties and other documents. The European Parliament’s websites and
those of its institutions make thousands of documents and transcripts available in
multiple languages.
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flawed because of “the use that citizens will make of the (now available)
information. . .”123 If information is used for nefarious purposes such as
influencing judicial decision-making, transparency would become a tool to chip
away at the protective shield which isolates judges from temptations, political and
venal influence. If this occurred, the impact on the Court’s authority and
legitimacy would be profound.
Greater transparency at the CJEU would be desirable. So would upgrades in the
quality of the Court’s judgments which are frequently described as unclear and not
well reasoned. On the surface, all of this seems to point to an easy remedy: Publish
dissenting opinion like the Americans do and achieve greater clarity in judgments
and transparency in judicial administration and proceedings.
However, that remedy has an uncertain path. Introducing separate opinions at the
CJEU would resolve one set of problems only to create new larger ones: (i)
producing new reasons to legitimize non-compliance with judgments; (ii)
introducing new threats to judicial independence because of endemic institutional
corruption.124
4

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
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Alemanno, supra: Other authors warn about the pitfalls of considering openness
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Heuller, Assessing EU Strategies for Publicity (2007) 14 Journal of European
Public Policy 563).
124

It should be noted that transparency as a disincentive to corruption works well
in government agencies in areas of public procurement, government contract bids
where bribery is notoriously present. (EU Anti-Corruption Report).
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Judicial independence is recognized the world over as a prerequisite for garnering
trust in a judicial institution; it gives a court authority and legitimacy.125 It is the
sine qua non of the institutional setting in which judging takes place free of threats
and venal or ideological considerations.126 Judicial independence supplies the
institutional matrix for democratic stability; protection of human rights and civil
liberties.127 A judicial institution maintains trust by upholding respect for the rule
of law and fundamental principles such as independence, impartiality and fairness
in its proceedings.128
Since inception, the CJEU has successfully shielded the work of its judiciary from
the public domain.129 It has done so by issuing unanimous institutional judgments
without disclosing individual judicial opinions, voting preferences and keeping no

125

Solanke supra, citing T. Bingham, The Rule of Law, London, Allen Lane, 2010.
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David S. Law, Judicial Independence, The International Encyclopedia of
Political Science, Vol. 5, pp. 1369-1272Social Science Research Network, (2010).
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To avoid conflicts of interest and to protect the judicial process, the EU in its
treaties requires the selection of judges whose independence is “beyond doubt.”129
The CJEU’s judicial oath extracts complete secrecy about deliberations, voting
tallies and anything that might disclose how a decision was arrived at by the
undisclosed majority- whether it was wide or narrow.
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records of opinions expressed during deliberations. Even the Court’s decisions are
sufficiently opaque that individual opinions of the judges are not conclusively
detectable.130 The judge’s themselves are sworn to secrecy during and after their
tenure on the Court. If judges were perceived to be buckling under to threats and
outside influence, public confidence would quickly disappear along with the
Court’s authority and legitimacy. The EU itself would not be able to bear such an
event.
The judiciary would lose its protective shield in the CJEU’s present judicial
environment with the introduction of dissenting opinion. That environment
includes a Court which delivers binding judgments meant to articulate laws to be
uniformly followed. It is a Court in which judges have only ‘renewable’ terms who
are dependent on member state governments to reappoint them. It is a Court in
which judges upon completion of those terms, however long or short, return to
their home states to continue former careers. They may face reprisals about
decisions made that may have displeased the national government.
It has been said that introducing separate opinions would allow member state
governments to better evaluate the performance of their representative judges since
they are not aware of judicial voting records and the positions that may have been
taken adverse to the interests of the home state.131
However, performance evaluation of any kind in a court of last resort in which
judges have only renewable terms would spell disaster; something akin to

A designated ‘rappatour’ does the writing on behalf of all the sitting judges, or
at least the majority which support it.
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Roland Vaubel, The Breakdown of the Rule of Law at the EU Level:
Implications for the Reform of the EU Court of Justice, (2013), a political
economist, Universitat Mannheim, Germany. Dr. Vaubel also says that judges
should be independent.
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positioning a mallet over their heads. It would also undermine the very things the
CJEU and courts all over the world work hard to achieve and protect – judicial
independence. Since the judges have limited terms, some may be tempted to decide
a case with an eye on their own future careers by favouring the home state in a
kind of “principal-agency” relationship. There is some credence to this if the ICJ, a
court which allows dissent, can be considered an apt example. At the ICJ, there is
“a remarkable trend on the part of other national judges …to publish dissenting
opinions whenever the decision [of the majority] is against their national state.”
This calls into question the degree of independence of judges hearing anything
relevant to their home states.132
At the ECtHR, allegations of political pressure on national judges led to a statutory
amendment setting fixed and non-renewable judicial terms of service. Although
fixed terms and non-renewability is offered as a remedy, no one suggests it be
particularly lengthy. This raises difficulties with attracting qualified candidates
willing to interrupt a productive career for a short tour of duty in Luxembourg with
the prospect of being frozen out afterwards. Fixing terms for judicial service is not
the answer either unless support for lengthy appointments materializes. There is no
evidence that long judicial careers are favoured for the CJEU by the European
Parliament or scholars.133
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Judges of the United States Supreme Court are appointed for life although many
retire at great ages. Some countries legislate a mandatory age of retirement. For
example, in Canada, the mandatory retirement age is 75 years for all superior court
(federal) judges. As a basis for comparison, the ICJ has nine year fixed terms.
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Another proposed remedy is publishing dissents and separate opinions
anonymously.134 However, expert Court observers would have little difficulty
identifying the author given the subject matter and even if not, public speculation
would be equally problematic exposing judges to political influence and
retribution. 135
These kinds of issues help crystalize the reasons why the prospect of introducing
dissenting opinion practice at the CJEU has been met with little enthusiasm. These
matters are discussed openly with scholarly consideration. However, the two most
troubling reasons why the CJEU should not introduce signed separate opinions are
not openly discussed in the same way at all.
Judicial influence and pressure has not been linked to the threat posed by
institutional corruption. Risks to the Court’s authority have not been examined at
all in terms of non-compliance with CJEU judgments when alternate opinions
appear and are more favourable to member state interests. These two elephants in
the room merit separate consideration.
4.1 Troubled Waters
When the Czech Constitutional Court figuratively thumbed its nose at the CJEU’s
decision in Landtová by declaring the Court’s decision ultra vires, it had the
earmarks of an “unprecedented display of judicial defiance.”136 In Landtová, the
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WTO and NAFTA hearing panels addressed the issue of protecting judges from
influence and pressure by allowing dissenting opinions to be published without
disclosing the identity of the dissenter.
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the Secretariat Legal Affairs Council, European Parliament November 2013.
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Arthur Dyeve, Domestic Judicial Non-Compliance in the European Union: A
Political Economic Approach.
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CJEU addressed the issue of how old age pension claims would be honoured by
the successor states of the former Czechoslovakia.137 After the CJEU published its
decision favouring citizen claims, the Czech national court announced it would not
be implementing it. The national court justified its decision by stating that the
CJEU judges simply got it all wrong.138
This was the first time that an EU member state national constitutional court had
applied the doctrine of ultra vires to declare a CJEU decision outside the Court’s
conferred powers and therefore not applicable.139 Ultimately, the CCC’s
“worrisome” conduct was deemed an anomaly rather than a ‘terrible blow to the
authority of EU law.” Of interest to the prospect of introducing dissenting opinion
at the CJEU is the CCCs contribution to the question of member state response.
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Christian Falvey, Constitutional Court defies EU with ruling on Czech-Slovak
pensions, Radio Prague internet posting February 15, 2012. C-399-09 (CJEU
(2012); PL US 5/12 (CCC). A CJEU judgment applying EU regulation1408/71.
Citizens of the Czech Republic who had worked were receiving lower pension
rates because they had worked in the area now part of the Slovak Republic. The
issue was brought to the CJEU by a 25-year veteran of the state-run Czechoslovak
railways who had retired and applied for his old age pension. The Czech Republic
reduced his pension by the 25 years he had worked in the present Slovak Republic
part of the former Czechoslovakia. The CJEU held that the practice was
discriminatory and required reinstatement of the full pensionable period.
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There are complicated issues surrounding the pension and similar questions
arising from the dissolution of the former Czechoslovakia which are not relevant to
the analysis here. There is no attempt here to diminish those issues. This case is
meant to demonstrate potential member state response to adverse decisions in a
CJEU which allows dissenting judicial opinion.
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Quarterly. Slovak Pensions Case (Pl. US 5/12).
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If member state defiance is forthcoming when the Court issues a single-result
decision, it is not difficult to make the quantum leap to what might occur if
multiple alternate opinions in a single judgment are in the mix. Troubled waters
may be in store if national courts are presented with alternate arguments to the
adverse decision of the majority. New and unforeseen consequences may emerge
such use of the alternate arguments to legitimize non-compliance with adverse
CJEU rulings.
The dissenting opinion appears most often in issues which strike an emotional
chord as they do in the American civil rights and liberties cases. The CJEU
equivalent would be national and local social issues similar to the issue in
Landtová. These are the kinds of cases which would inspire member states to look
for ways to make an adverse ruling inapplicable to themselves as Landtová
demonstrates.
The member state national courts are the primary source of CJEU authority and
legitimacy. The Court’s judgments must be accepted by the member states and the
CJEU’s authority recognized.140 Member state support of CJEU judgments is also
critical to the operations of the EU law legal regime itself. The failure of member
state national courts to comply with CJEU judgments would impair the
effectiveness of EU law; the more severe and the longer the duration; the greater
the erosion.141 Neither the EU nor the CJEU have capacity (budget or bureaucracy)
to enforce compliance with Courts judgments directly. They must rely on the
member states and their national courts to fulfil their obligations.

Bundzen, supra citing: Anthony Arnull I “The European Union and its Court of
Justice, Oxford University Press (1999) @84: “only loyal acceptance will ensure
that it (EU) achieves its intended objective.”
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Diana Panke, Why The ECJ Restores Compliance Faster in Some Cases Than in
Others, (2007), Freie Universitat Berlin. Berlin Working Paper on European
Integration No. 4.
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Although historically high levels of compliance have been recorded, there are
strong indications that this does not necessarily mean the national courts have fully
accepted the Court’s decisions. At the same time there is little known about
whether national courts are actually satisfied with CJEU rulings or accept them as
authoritative. Interpreting silence as compliance is only assumed.142
In the early years of the EU, some countries took the position they would comply
with Court rulings as long as they were not in conflict with their own national
laws. This position changed over time as the Court evolved. While some states
avoid collisions with the European Commission (EU governing body) and the
CJEU by grumbling but complying with the Court’s rulings, others must be forced
to do so. The United Kingdom and Germany, for example, have had outstanding
compliance issues for as long as 15 and 14 years, respectively.143
The reasons why member states fail to comply is as complex as the domestic
judicial politics demonstrated in Landtová and as simple as state cost-benefit
analyses and low political capacities.144 Non-compliance is demonstrated by
unilateral evasion, a push for secondary legislation, or a rallying cry among other
EU Member States for Treaty revision.145 Whatever the reason might be for
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Members States, Court Referrals, and (Non-) Compliance (2005) prepared for the
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Geoffrey Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, The European Court
of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union
(1998), The International Organization Foundation. This issue is not unique to the
CJEU, the United Supreme Court has grappled with lower court non-compliance as
well. See Robert McKeever, The United States Supreme Court: A Political and
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member state non-compliance with Court rulings, the Commission must decide
how it will react.146 If the Commission decides to proceed, the first step is
infringement proceedings through dialogue with the non-complying state.147 If the
Commission is unable to extract compliance, it may refer the case to the CJEU.
The Court’s work begins with an adjudication phase and hearings followed by a
judgment. If non-compliance continues, the Court conducts enforcement
proceedings148 out of which substantial financial penalties may be levied. Because
member states often waited until the 11th hour to fulfill their obligations, lump sum
sanctions are now permitted covering all stages not just the conclusion of the
proceedings.149 This was intended to financially curb the propensity for last minute
only response. While the “vast majority” of states are presently compliant, there
appears to be evidence of a possible trend towards non-compliance in the Court’s
present judicial environment.150
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Member state national courts expect CJEU decisions to contain “defensible and
practical judicial reasons, clearly discernible, free of contradictions and reversals
which can be implemented at the national level.”151 How member states would
respond to something less than a decisive result from the CJEU in terms of
compliance is unknown.
There are many questions about new and unforeseen consequences which need to
be explored before an informed decision could be made about introducing
dissenting opinion at the CJEU. In the last decade alone, the list of EU member
states has nearly doubled. These new entrants arrived with “rather strong ideas and
often a strong set of historical grievances.”152 Choosing non-compliance with
adverse decisions of the CJEU on the basis of a preference for a minority opinion
that suits them better would not be off limits.
The prospect of non-compliance threatening the Court’s authority is not the only
major issue hovering in the background in the debate about introducing dissenting
opinion at the CJEU. The other elephant in the room, institutional corruption poses
a potential full frontal attack on judicial independence.153
4.2 Breathtaking Corruption
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House, Nations in Transition.
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BBC News Europe carried an eye popping headline on its internet news service on
February 3, 2014: “Corruption Across EU ‘breathtaking.’154 The news report
quoted from a comprehensive report released to the European Commission and
Parliament that same day.155 The Report covered all 28 member states and assessed
the extent of corruption and its toll on the EU economy and society. A pervasive
problem was identified across the entire EU with some states far more affected
than others. Bribery in government procurement is one of the most rooted problem
areas.156
Membership in the EU does not mean that all states are at the same level of
development politically, socially or juridically. Some of the new EU member states
are “struggling to meet high democratic standards of transparency and probity
while saddled with incompletely reformed institutions”. There is also influence
from neighboring authoritarian states as noted here: “The notion that the EU border
will function passively as a sort of firewall against the corrosive influence of these
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EU Anti-Corruption Report of the EU Home Affairs Commissioner to the EU
Council and the European Parliament (3 February 2014). Data align with two
major opinion polls by Eurobarometer, the Commission’s polling service on
perceptions of corruption and experience with corruption. The study concludes that
corruption has been described as ‘an obstacle to doing business in Europe.’ Bribery
is identified as a pervasive problem and appears in all levels of public
procurement; political party financing. Bulgaria, Romania and Italy were identified
as ‘hotspots for organised crime gangs in the EU’. There are about 3,000 such
gangs in the EU according to EU police agency Europol. White-collar crimes like
bribery and sales tax fraud ‘plague many EU countries.’
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[autocratic] regimes is a dangerous illusion.”157 As a result, the durability of the
new found commitment by emerging EU democracies to the rule of law and
democratic principles remains in question.
The organization, Nations in Transition, which establishes annual scores for new
democracies, identifies corruption as: Bribery, graft, conflicts of interest, influence
pedaling, dubious legal decisions and a wide range of allegations of corruption
against senior government officials.158 Among the EU states, Bulgaria has been
singled out as a country with one of the most corrupt legal systems in the world
and Romania has similar challenges.159Slovakia and Estonia had downgraded
democracy scores to reflect ‘backsliding’ in solidifying their democratic
institutions since joining the EU. The Czech Republic improved its score on
‘judicial framework and independence’ through an increase in anti-corruption
activity in the prosecutor’s office. Despite problems in other categories, Hungary
improved its ‘judicial framework and independence’ score by issuing judicial
decisions ridding the country of bad laws.
Efforts towards remedies vary among the EU states since judicial institutions in
previous authoritarian regimes were appendages of government. Long serving
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judges in the national courts may “retain old habits of venality, equivocation or
deference to the political establishment may contribute to the phenomenon” [of
corruption].
However, “there is reason to hope that a younger generation of jurists may prove
more effective.”160 Nevertheless, it may take a long time before that new juristic
influence talks hold sufficiently to counteract the historical pattern.
The challenge of corruption is not restricted to new entrants to the EU member
state family. In Italy, one of the EU founding member states, legal measures had to
be instituted to aid autonomy and independence of the judiciary.
Until the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was stripped of his
parliamentary seat after he was convicted of criminal charges including abuse of
office, in June 2013, efforts to isolate the judiciary from political influence had
been unsuccessful. As noted at the time “the campaign run by Berlusconi against
the judiciary seriously undermined public confidence in the judiciary.161
This snapshot of corruption among EU member states raises issues about how a
move by the CJEU away from the present high level of protection of judicial
independence would play out. Introducing dissenting opinion identifies judges and
exposes them to threats and pressures through unscrupulous or nefarious activities.
This challenge compounds the problem earlier identified – the prospect of judges
looking over their shoulders when term renewal time arrives.
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The potential for pressure from national governments on “their” judge and from
national public opinion is substantial.162 The effect on the Court’s authority in the
event the public perception of its judiciary became associated with susceptibility to
external pressure would be profound. Its authority would most certainly be
diminished if not obliterated.
It is not difficult to imagine that both old and new members would act in
unpredictable ways to a change in judgment practice at the CJEU. With corruption
so endemic among many EU member states, it is more than likely that responses to
a change of judicial practice would expose CJEU judges to threats, influence and
political whim.

4.3 Risking Authority
It should be clear at this point that introducing separate writing practice at the
CJEU and publishing judicial voting records would amount to risk taking of the
highest order.
As the impartial interpreter of EU Law, the CJEU requires solid authority.163
Although respect for the Court is strong throughout the EU at the present time,
there is also a perception that the CJEU has become remarkably powerful as a
result of its own development of previously unknown legal doctrines such as
supremacy and direct effect. This scooping up of power is viewed by some
member states as a chipping away of their sovereignty.164 There is a desire to
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constrain what some member states regard as the Court’s expansive lawmaking.165
One way to constrain the expanding power of the Court would be to introduce
dissenting opinion thereby effectively weakening judicial decisions and
neutralizing the power of the Court. It would have the added effect of slowing the
pace of what is perceived to be the Court’s relentless march towards EU
integration at the expense of member state interests. A desire to slow the pace of
integration by weakening the Court’s power may have more currency than other
reasons for introducing dissenting opinion such as achieving greater
transparency.166
Morten Messerschmidt,167 a member of the European Parliament (Denmark) and
Vice Chair of its Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, has called for
adoption of separate opinion practice at the CJEU for that very reason. He
suggests, as others have, that the practice should follow “along the lines of the
United States Supreme Court.” The MEP’s interest in introducing dissenting
opinion has a political focus — containing the power and authority of the Court to
slow the pace of European integration in the interests of member state sovereignty.
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Pointing out that the EU is not a country and that member states have no common
ethos, he sees dissenting opinion as a tool for limiting CJEU authority and reach. It
is also his view that the CJEU favours integration over member state sovereignty
and by doing so demonstrates a political bias. He is not alone in his take on the
Court’s integration pace. It has been suggested that the CJEU should ‘soften’ its
pro integration stance.168
Efforts to constrain integration by weakening the Court’s authority and legitimacy
may only have the effect of inciting the Court to cater to the demands of member
states.169 The political elements of the debate are well beyond the scope of this
thesis but are relevant for at least the purpose of demonstrating that separate
opinions are perceived as weaker judgments.
Unanimous opinions have been recognized as more powerful because they bring
authority to the judgment. For that reason, President Jefferson favoured the
seriatim style of England – to make the Court the weak institution he believed the
founders had intended. Chief Justice Marshall discouraged divergent opinion
because he wanted to build a strong Court. Today, the United States Supreme
Court relies on unanimous unsigned per curiam institutional judgments when it
wishes to convey a definitive and strong statement to the American people and to
bring “institutional strength to a controversial decision.”170
Proponents of dissenting opinion at the CJEU argue that great strides in
transparency and clarity of the Court’s processes and judgments “might, could or

168

Henri de Waele, The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration
Process: A Contemporary and Normative Assessment, [2010] Hanse Law Review
Vo.. 6, No. 1. Suggested that the CJEU ought to ‘soften’ its pro-integration stance.
169
170

Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz, supra

Friedland, Ham, J Bleitch, Ress and Feinberg, supra. Brown v. Board of
Education, supra.
55

should” be achieved.171 This language of uncertainty frequently appears in
academic literature discussing the potential advantages of dissenting opinion at the
CJEU; yet nothing can be clear about uncertainty. Those same proponents are not
discussing the full implications of dissenting opinion either.
By having disallowed separate opinions all along, the CJEU may have been quietly
protecting its own authority and legitimacy. Among the Court’s stated reasons for
keeping dissenting opinion and the voting records of judges private is that very
thing – risks to the Court’s authority and legitimacy and exposing the CJEU
judiciary to public influence and political pressure. Insight into how that might
play out is already nearby.
If multiple opinions in a single judgment are presented to member state national
courts, some may adopt the Czech Republic’s brazen approach in Landtová and
challenge the CJEU’s decision despite their lower positions in the EU judicial
hierarchy. Refusing to comply with a CJEU judgment on the premise that the
dissenting judge(s) got it right and the majority got it all wrong would be a direct
strike at the heart of the Court’s authority. Risk to its authority is not something the
CJEU has invited at any time throughout its history.
5

OPENING PANDORA’S BOX

The CJEU is one of the world’s most influential courts as well as a trusted EU
institution with everything to lose if its authority and legitimacy were undermined.
Introducing dissenting opinion with its one-vote margins and pluralities in the
Court’s present judicial environment has potentially insurmountable risks. The
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result could be a Pandora’s Box of unwanted contents which once opened cannot
be closed.
It has been demonstrated in the foregoing analysis that fragmented judgments at
the CJEU would be interpreted by member states in any way that advanced their
own interests through legitimizing noncompliance with Court rulings. With
judicial voting records publicly exposed, there is a high probability that member
states would engage in unprincipled behaviours which would threaten judicial
independence and the Court’s authority and legitimacy. It may take generations for
the EU member states to come to grips with the level of institutional corruption
recently identified. It may take the emerging democracies just as much time to
settle into a new state of being where the rule of law prevails absent historical
grievances and other distractions.
Publishing separate opinions and judicial voting records appears to be the only
option seriously considered so far in the push for greater transparency at the CJEU.
Rather than putting its authority and legitimacy at risk, another direction could be
followed. The Court could revise its present practices to illicit greater transparency
drawing from the best of the common and civil law traditions in two important
areas: (i) oral hearings and (ii) written judgments.
The oral hearing is an under-utilized feature of the Court and is governed by its
own Rules of Procedure.172 Hearings could be publicized and expanded well
beyond the current abbreviated process lasting scant minutes with little general
public awareness that they are even taking place. Allowing the kind of judge-
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lawyer discussion, banter and debate familiar in common law appellate courts
would go a long way toward fleshing out all aspects of the case. Lawyers, litigants
and citizens generally would see and hear for themselves what the Court
considered in arriving at its decision thereby going a long distance towards greater
transparency. Doing so would also provide a window into the decision-making
process which citizens could come to understand and trust as they listen to the
discussion of the issues relevant to their case. Even if their legal point did not win
the day, they would at least come to understand that it was considered and
understood.173
The CJEU has been criticized for delivering shallow, bland and unclear judgments
which lack transparency. The Court could enhance its judgments through qualitycontrol and refraining from “one-sided systematic and teleological reasoning” and
“making a visible attempt at more balanced interpreting.”174 Informing and
educating litigants and EU citizens in plain language about what its decisions mean
for them would contribute greatly to transparency and respect for the process.
Writing more expansively in a clear and compelling fashion similar to the Court’s
Advocates General opinion style would be an option as well. Although more
expansive judgment writing would command greater resources for translation
services, the cost would be modest compared to the prospect of publishing the
many potential separate opinions of its judiciary.
In summary, the CJEU’s juristic umbrella provides a canopy for member states
from both common law and civil law traditions. There is blurring of the lines
between the traditions already. It would not be too great an exercise for the Court
to draw more from the common law tradition by expanding its oral public hearings
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into something more meaningful and to produce better written decisions for a
wider audience in a more expansive, informative and educational way.
Changes along these lines would create a refreshing new profile for the CJEU and
give meaning to the EU’s legislative commitment to maximizing transparency for
its citizens without placing the Court’s own authority at risk.
~
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